Alle origini di una teoria economica della politica/Bibliografia

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Carlo Bottai - Alle origini di una teoria economica della politica: il teorema dell'elettore mediano a partire dai testi di Black e Downs (2009)

Bibliografia

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Alle origini di una teoria economica della politica

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A

Alberto Alesina (1988), “Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Tow-Party System with Rational Voters”, American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 796-805.
Kenneth J. Arrow (1951), Social choice and individual values, New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Kenneth J. Arrow (1992), “General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice”. In Assar Lindbeck (a cura di), Economic sciences, 1969-1980: the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. Reperibile dal WWW: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1972/arrow-lecture.pdf (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).

B

Gianfranco Baldini e Adriano Pappalardo (2004), Sistemi elettorali e partiti nelle democrazie contemporanee, 1a ed., Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli.
Enrico Barone (1937), Le opere economiche, vol. III: “Principi di economia finanziaria”, Bologna: Zanichelli.
Duncan Black (1948), “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, No. 1 , 23-34.
Duncan Black (1987), The Theory of Committees and Elections, 5a ed., Norwell (Mass.): Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Duncan Black (1998), The Theory of Committees and Elections e Duncan Black e Robert A. Newing, Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation, 2a ed. rivista, a cura di Iain McLean, Alistair MacMillan, Burt L. Monroe, prefazione di Ronald H. Coase, Norwell (Mass.): Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Douglas H. Blair e Robert A. Pollak (1983), “Rational Collective Choice”, Scientific American, Vol. 249, No. 2, 88-95.
André Blais (1988), “The Classification of Electoral Systems”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 16, n.1, 99-110.
James Buchanan (1995), “Interview with James Buchanan”, The Region, The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Reperibile nel WWW: http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3682 (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
James M. Buchanan e Richard A. Musgrave (1999), Public finance and public choice: two contrasting visions of the State, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.

C

Ronald H. Coase (1997), “The Institutional Structure of Production”. In Torsten Persson (a cura di), Economic sciences, 1991-1995: the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. Reperibile nel WWW: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
Roger D. Congleton (2004), “The Median Voter Model”. In Charles K. Rowley, Friedrich Schneider (a cura di), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 2a ed., New York: Kluwer Academic Press. Reperibile nel WWW: http://rdc1.net/forthcoming/MEDIANVT.pdf.

D

Otto A. Davis, Morris H. DeGroot e Melvin J. Hinich (1972), “Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule”, Econometrica, Vol. 40, No. 1, 147-157.
Anthony Downs (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, 1a ed., New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Patrick Dunleavy (1991), Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: economic explanations in political science, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

E

David Easton (1953), The Political System. An Inquiry into the State of Political Science, New York: Knopf.
James M. Enelow e Melvin J. Hinich (1984), The Spatial Theory of Voting, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

F

Leon Felkins (ultima revisione 2009), “Introduction to Public Choice Theory”, A Rational Life: A Discussion of the Peculiar Consequences of Individuals Living in Groups. Reperibile nel WWW: http://perspicuity.net/sd/pub-choice.html (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
Robert H. Frank (2006), Microeconomics and Behavior, 6a ed., McGraw-Hill (tr. it. a cura di Romano Piras, Microeconomia, 4a ed., Milano: McGraw-Hill, 2007).
Milton Friedman (1953), The Methodology of Positive Economics. In id., Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

G

Gianluigi Galeotti (1995), “economia della politica”. In AA. VV., Enciclopedia dell’economia Garzanti, 2a ed., Milano: Garzanti.
Francesco Galgano (2007), La forza del numero e la legge della ragione. Storia del principio di maggioranza, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Bernard Grofman, William Koetzle, Samuel Merrill e Thomas Brunell (2001), “Changes in the location of the median voter in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963-1996”, Public Choice, Vol. 106, No. 3-4, 221-232.

H

Arye L. Hillman (2003), Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government, 1a ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.
Arye L. Hillman (2009), Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government, 2a ed., New York: Cambridge University Press.
Albert O. Hirschman (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.
Randall G. Holcombe (1989), “The Median Voter Model in Public Choice Theory”, Public Choice, Vol. 61, No. 2, 115-125.
Harold Hotelling (1929), “Stability in Competition”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 39, No. 153, 41-57.

L

David S. Lee, Enrico Moretti e Matthew J. Butler (2004), “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 3, 807-859.
Arend Lijphart (1999), Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven (CT): Yale University Press (tr. it. Luca Verzichelli, Le democrazie contemporanee, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001).
Erik R. Lindahl (1958), Just Taxation: a positive solution. In Richard Musgrave and Alan Peacock (a cura di), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, Londra: Macmillan.

M

James Madison (1788), “The Federalist no. 51”, Independent Journal. Reperibile nel WWW: http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm.
Antonio Di Majo (2003), Lezioni di scienza delle finanze, 1a ed., Genova: ECIG.
Kenneth O. May (1952), “A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision”, Econometrica, Vol. 20, No. 4, 680-684.
Nicholas R. Miller (ultima revisione 2003), Minorities vs. Majorities: the Location of the Median in a Mixed Normal Distribution, Department of Political Science, University of Maryland Baltimore County. Reperibile nel WWW: http://userpages.umbc.edu/~nmiller/RESEARCH/MEDIAN.REV.pdf (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
Dennis C. Mueller (2003), Public choice III, 1a ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

N

William A. Niskanen (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.

O

J. J. O’Connor and E. F. Robertson (2002), The history of voting, School of Mathematical and Computational Sciences, University of St Andrews. Reperibile nel WWW: http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/Voting.html (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).

P

Fioravante Patrone (ultima revisione 2007), Teorema di May. Reperibile nel WWW: http://dri.diptem.unige.it/altro_materiale/teorema_di_May.pdf (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
Charles R. Plott (1967), “A Notion of Equilibrium and Possibility under Majority Rule”, American Journal Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, 787-806.
Werner W. Pommerehne (1978), “Institutional Approaches to Public Expenditures. Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 9, No. 9, 255-280.
Keith T. Poole e Howard Rosenthal (1997), Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting, New York: Oxford University Press.
Donatella della Porta (2002), Introduzione alla scienza politica, 1a ed., Bologna: Il Mulino.

R

Douglas W. Rea (1967), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New Haven (CT):Yale University Press.
Harvey S. Rosen (2002), Public Finance, 6a ed., McGraw-Hill (tr. it. a cura di Chiara Rapallini (2003), Scienza delle Finanze, Milano: McGraw-Hill).

A cura di Charles K. Rowley e Friedrich G. Schneider (2008), Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, 1a ed., Springer.

S

Paul A. Samuelson (1954), “The Theory of Public Expenditure”, Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 36, No. 4, 386-389.
Giovanni Sartori (1990), Elementi di teoria politica, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1950), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper & Brother.
William F. Shughart II (2008), "Public Choice", The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Library of Economics and Liberty. Reperibile nel WWW: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html (consultato il 13 Novembre 2009).
Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations (2007), a cura di S. M. Soares, MetaLibri Digital Library. Reperibile nel WWW: http://metalibri.wikidot.com/title:an-inquiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-wealth-of-nations:smith-a
Arthur Smithies (1941), “Optimum Location in Spatial Competition”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 49, No. 3, 423-439.

T

Gordon Tullock (1991), “Duncan Black: The Founding Father”, Public Choice, Vol. 71, No. 3, 125-128.

V

Luciano Violante (2006), Lettera ai giovani sulla Costituzione, 1a ed., Casale Monferrato (AL): Edizioni PIEMME.